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Abstract. We propose an equilibrium reﬁnement of strict perfect equilib-
rium for the ﬁnite normal form games, which is not known in the literature.
Okada came up with the idea of strict perfect equilibrium by strengthening
the main deﬁnition of a perfect equilibrium, due to Selten [14]. We consider
the alternative (and equivalent) deﬁnition of perfect equilibrium, based on
the substitute sequences, as appeared in Selten [14].
We show that by strengthening and modiﬁyng this deﬁnition slightly, one
can obtain a reﬁnement stronger than strict perfectness. We call the new
reﬁnement strict substitute perfect equilibrium. The main advantage of this
solution concept is that it reﬂects the local dominance of an equilibrium
point. An example is provided to show that a strict perfect equilibrium
may fail to be strict substitute perfect.
JEL classiﬁcation: C7
Keywords: Perfect equilibrium, strictly perfect equilibrium, substitute se-
quence, substitute perfect equilibrium, unit simplex.
1. Introduction
The concept of equilibrium is central in the game theory, for it captures the essence
of payoﬀ-maximizing behavior of players faced with interactions and predicts how
the game should be played. The answer to the question which outcome should be
Date: August 24, 2009.
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considered reasonable determines the solution concept. The basic idea underlying
equilibrium is non-regretting, or no proﬁtable deviation for a single player when-
ever others stick to their strategies, which gives rise to the deﬁnition of a Nash
equilibrium.
However, some strategy proﬁles that pass the basic equilibrium requirement still
fail to match our intuition about the way the game should be played. There were
many reﬁnements of a Nash equilibrium concept introduced in order to eliminate
intuitively unreasonable equilibria. Most of them were based on robustness to slight
imperfections of rationality, which was originated by Selten [14]. Whether you re-
quire stability against arbitrary deviations from rationality approaching zero or de-
viation satisfying certain strengthened criteria may give you reﬁnements as proper
equilibrium proposed by Myerson [7] or strictly perfect equilibrium by Okada [10].
We follow the same principle of bounded rationality requiring stability against
certain perturbations of rationality, namely by requiring that a reﬁned equilibrium
should be stable against every substitute sequence for itself satisfying certain proper-
ties. We basically strengthen the alternative characterization of perfect equilibrium
points, which gives even stronger reﬁnement than strict perfection.
The paper is organized as follows. In the section Deﬁnitions and Methodology
we present our framework and provide the deﬁnitions of the concepts we are using
throughout this paper. In the next section we review some of the equilibrium con-
cepts currently being used in the literature, outline their advantages and limitations,
and illustrate the necessity of further reﬁnement.
In the fourth section we are narrowing the notion of a substitute sequence, intro-
ducing so-called ultra-substitute sequences, and strengthen the deﬁnition of perfect
equilibrium, requiring that the reﬁned equilibrium should be a best reply against
every substitute sequence eventually. We show that the new solution concept is ac-
tually a reﬁnement of strict perfect and hence proper equilibria (Theorem 4.6). Ex-
ample 4.7 motivates strict substitute perfect equilibria, showing that it can actually
eliminate unreasonably equilibria, which proper and even strictly perfect equilibria
cannot rule out.
In this Section 4 we also provide characterization of the proposed reﬁnement
in terms of behavior of best responces in a neighborhood of an equilibrium point
(Lemma 4.4) and the local dominance (Theorem 4.9). The latter strengthens the mo-
tivation for the reﬁnement, for local dominance is a desirable property that supports
our intuition about a useful reﬁnement (yet this property may be rather restrictive,
which results in strict substitute perfect equilibria failing to exist in some games).3
2. Definitions and Methodology
Deﬁnition 2.1. A normal form Γ of a ﬁnite n-player game is a tuple (Π1,⋅⋅⋅ ,Π , ),
where Π  is a ﬁnite set of pure strategies of player  , Π =
Q 
 =1 Π , and   : Π→ →ℝ 
is the payoﬀ function that assigns to every   ∈ Π the vector of payoﬀs  ( ) =
( 1( ),⋅⋅⋅ ,  ( )).
Deﬁnition 2.2. A mixed strategy    for player   is a probability distribution over
Π . The set of all such probability distributions is denoted by    ≡ Δ i, where    is
the cardinality of Π . The set of mixed strategies for the game Γ is   =
Q 
 =1   .
We can now deﬁne an expected payoﬀ function ℎ, which is an extension of the
payoﬀ function   to all of  .




 1( ) 2( )⋅⋅⋅  ( ) ( ),
where   ( ) is the probability that   assigns to the   ℎ component of  , i.e., the
probability with which player   chooses   .
Mixed strategy    for player   is comletely mixed if    ∈ Δ 
 i. Mixed strategy   is
completely mixed if for all  ,    is completely mixed.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A perturbed game ˆ Γ of a normal form game Γ is a tuple (Γ, ),





  ≤ 1,
such that for each   ∈ {1,..., } and   ∈ {1,...,  } we have
  ( 
 
 ) ≥  
 
 ,
and for each   the following holds:
 i X
 =1
  ( 
 
 ) = 1.4
So vector   can be interpreted as a vector of minimum probabilities corresponding
to each   
  ∈ Π . A perturbed game has the property that pure strategies are ruled
out, that is the action set ˆ    for generic player   is a subset of (  )0.
The latter restriction gives rise to the notion of maximum probability of the choice
  
 . Observe that since no pure strategy can be played with zero probability, no pure
strategy can be played with probability one either.
Deﬁnition 2.5. A maximum probability of the choice   











  < 1.
Deﬁnition 2.6. Gven any topological spaces  1,...,  , a projection map onto
 ’s factor is a function    :
Q 
 =1   → →   deﬁned by the equation
  ( 1,...,  −1,  ,  +1,...,  ) =   .
Deﬁnition 2.7. A strategy ˜    of player   is called a weakly (strictly) dominant
strategy if for every  −  ∈  −  and    ∈   ,   (˜   , − ) >   (  , − ) (  (˜   , − ) ≥
  (  , − )).
Deﬁnition 2.8. A sequence of mixed strategies {  } is called a substitute se-
quence for a mixed strategy   if    ∈    for every   ∈ ℕ and lim →∞    =  .
Deﬁnition 2.9. A mixed strategy  ∗






for  −  if  ∗ is in the best responce to   
−  for every   ∈ ℕ.
Deﬁnition 2.10. A mixed strategy  ∗ ∈   is called a substitute perfect equilib-
rium point of a normal form game Γ if  ∗
  is a best reply to at least one substitute
sequence for  ∗, say {  }. That is,  ∗





for each player  .
Deﬁnition 2.11. A mixed strategy  ∗ ∈   is called a perfect equilibrium point
of a normal form game Γ if  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ and for some sequence
of perturbed games ˆ Γ  = (Γ,  ) with    → 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium point
   of ˆ Γ  for each   such that    →  ∗ as   → ∞.
Selten [14] showed that a strategy proﬁle is perfect equilibrium if and only if it is
substitute perfect equilibrium.5
Deﬁnition 2.12. A mixed strategy  ∗ ∈   is called a strictly perfect equilibrium
point of a normal form game Γ if  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ and for any sequence
of perturbed games ˆ Γ  = (Γ,  ) with    → 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium point
   of ˆ Γ  for each   such that    →  ∗ as   → ∞.
3. Motivation and Overview of Existing Equilibrium Concepts
There have been many equilibrium concepts proposed by game theorists, each
having its own advantages and limitations. The broadest deﬁnition is due to Nash,
who proposed it in his pioneering work [8]. This formulation of equilibrium appeared
to be weak, however it is fundamenatal in the economic literature and serves as a
basis for further equilibrium reﬁnements.
Selten [13] strengthened the deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium, eliminating non-
credible threats in the extensive form games by introducing a subgame perfect
equilibrium (proﬁle that induces Nash equilibrium on every subgame). He did
not yet take into account the small imperfections of rationality, and there were a
number of limitations, which called for revising the equilibrium concept. In fact, for
the normal form games Nash and subgame perfect equilibria coincide.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) further stregthened the concept of equilibrium and in-
troduced sequential equilibria by imposing the criterion of sequential rationality
(optimal play starting from every information set) and consistency. Yet, sequential
and Nash equilibria coincide in case of a normal form game.
Selten realized the limitations of subgame perfect equilibria (in particular, they
don’t resolve all the problems related to the unreached parts of the game) and took a
novel approach to deﬁning an equilibrium. The basic idea of the equilibrium concept
proposed by him is stability against arbitrary imperfections of rationality.
For this purpose Selten [14] introduced the so-called “Model of Slight Mistakes”.
According to it, for every player   there is a small probability for the breakdown of
rationality    > 0. Whenever rationality breaks down, every choice   ∈ Π  is selected
with some positive probability   
 .
Suppose that player   intends to select the choice   with probability   . In case
of imperfect rationality the total probability of selecting the choice   is6
ˆ    = (1 −   )   +    
 
  . (3.1)
Notice that the mapping   :   → ˆ   deﬁned by the equation 3.1 for each player  
is one-to-one and onto. This implies that under incomplete rstionality, the problem
of choosing a strategy from  , which brings the payoﬀ according to the composite
function ℎ ∘  , is equivalent to choosing a strategy from ˆ   with the corresponding
payoﬀ determined by ℎ.
In fact, the function   is a homeomorphism from   to ˆ  , since it is continuous
by deﬁnition, and the inverse function  −1 : ˆ   →   deﬁned by
   =
1
1 −   




Thus, the speciﬁed probabilities   and   transform the original normal form game
Γ into the perturbed game ˆ Γ, where the strategy space of each player is restricted
according to the corresponding vector of minimum probabilities
 
 
  =    
 
  . (3.3)
Selten treated complete rationality as a limiting case of incomplete rationality.
In case of imperfect rationality players make mistakes (“hand trembles”), but when
the vector of mistake probabilities   approaches zero (which implies that the vector
of minimum probabilities   goes to zero), we can determine whether there is any
sequence of equilibrium points for perturbed games approaching a given equilibrium
point of the original game. If there exists such a sequence for at least one sequence
of trembles converging to zero, we call the equilibrium point of the original game
perfect, or stable against certain rationality imperfections.
Then, the natural question arises whether we can ﬁnd such sequence of equilibrium
points for any sequence of trembles approaching zero. It turns out that in general
the answer is no, which is due to Okada [10]. He found a set of conditions for
games that guarantee the strengthened requirement of perfectness to hold. With this
strengthened condition he introduced a reﬁnement of perfectness concept - strictly
perfect equilibria.
Myerson [7] as well strengthened the perfectness concept by imposing a restriction
that more costly mistakes are made with smaller probability, introducing proper
equilibria. It is rather a restriction of the way incomplete raionality approaches7
complete rationality. No surprisingly then, every proper equilibrium is strictly per-
fect.
It is worth mentioning that proper equilibria are attractive in the sense that, being
stronger than perfect equilibria, they exist for any normal form game, while strictly
perfect equilibria may fail to exist.
There is a substantial common drawback of all the known reﬁnements based on
the trembling-hand framework. It is assumed that probabilities    and   are com-
mon knowledge. However, those probabilities are due to “unspeciﬁed psycholog-
ical mechanism” (Selten, [14]), and the common knowledge assumption seems too
restrictive.
For any player  , other players should rather have a sense of the degree of player  ’s
irrationality (bounds on    and   ) rather than speciﬁc values of those probabilities.
This motivated us to propose a new reﬁnement of perfect equilibria, which relaxes
the common knowledge assumption.
4. The New Solution Concept: Definition and Properties
We ﬁrst introduce some new deﬁnitions and concepts that are key in formulat-
ing the new reﬁnement, which we call strict substitute perfect equilibrium. As we
mentioned, one way to obtain the reﬁnement of perfect equilibria is to consider its
main deﬁnition proposed by Selten [12, p.38], and strengthen it, requiring that a
strict perfect equilibrium point is a limit equilibrium point for every sequence of
perturbed games.
Another way to reﬁne the perfectness concept is to consider the characterization
of a substitute perfect equilibrium, due to Selten [12, p.49], which can be basically
regarded as an alternative deﬁnition of a perfect equilibrium, for Selten showed that
these two concepts are equivalent.
This way to obtain further reﬁnement has not been considered in the literature so
far. We show that strengthening the alternative deﬁnition in a certain way allows to
obtain a reﬁnement which is stronger than strict perfectness. We basically require
that a reﬁned equilibrium is a best reply to every substitute sequence that possesses
certain properties. For these purposes we introduce an ultra-substitute sequence of
strategies.8
Deﬁnition 4.1. A sequence of mixed strategies {  } is called an ultra-substitute
sequence for a mixed strategy   if the following conditions hold:
(1)    ∈    for every   ∈ ℕ, that is, each strategy proﬁle    is completely mixed,
(2)   
  =    for all   and for every   ∈ {1,..., } such that    ∈   
 ,
(3) lim →∞    =  .
As we can see, for any given strategy proﬁle every ultra-substitute sequence is a
substitute sequence, however the converse may not be true. Also, if   is interior,
then the only substitute sequence for   is the constant sequence {  } such that
   =   for all  .
Deﬁnition 4.2. A mixed strategy  ∗
  ∈    of player   is eventually a best reply





for  −  if there exists   > 0 such that  ∗
  is a best
reply to   
−  for every   ≥  .
The idea of the further reﬁnement of perfect equilibrium is to require stability
against any ultra-substitute sequence eventually. That is, the behavior of ﬁnite
number of terms in the substitute sequence does not matter (as it does not matter
for convergence of any sequence or series), what matters is the limiting behavior, or,
as it turns out (see Lemma 3.4), the behavior in some neighborhood of an equilibrium
proﬁle.
Deﬁnition 4.3. A mixed strategy proﬁle  ∗ = ( ∗
1,..., ∗
 ) ∈   is called a strict
substitute perfect equilibrium point of a normal form game Γ if  ∗ is eventually
a best reply to every ultra-substitute sequence    for itself.
Notice that an interior Nash equilibrium point is automatically a strict substitute
perfect equilibrium point.
Let us introduce the following notation. Let   denote the index set of players for
the game, that is, for the  -person game we have   = {1,..., }. Given a strategy
proﬁle   ∈  , introduce  1( ) as the set of all   ∈   such that    is on the boundary
of   ; similarly let  2( ) denote the set of all   ∈   such that    is in the interior of
  . Since any point in a set is either in the interior of it or on the boundary, the
two index sets deﬁne a partition of the index set  , that is,
  =  1( ) ⊔  2( ) for any strategy proﬁle   ∈  .
The following lemma provides characterization of a strict substitute perfect equi-
librium in terms of behavior of the best responce correspondence on the neighbor-
hoods of an equilibrium point. That is, it gives the necessary and suﬃcient condition9
for strict substitute perfectness. Essentially this condition requires the equilibrium
point to be a best reply to every strategy proﬁle in some “neighborhhod” of itself (it
is not a neighborhood strictly speaking because its projection onto any index from
 2 degenerates to a singleton).
Lemma 4.4. A strategy proﬁle  ∗ is a strict substitute perfect equilibrium if and
only if there exists a neighborhood   of  ∗ such that  ∗ is a best reply to   whenever
  ( ) ∈   (  ) for each   ∈  1( ∗) and   ( ) =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗).
Proof. (⇒)
Claim 1. Strict substitute perfect equilibrium at  ∗ implies that there exists a neigh-
borhood   of  ∗ such that  ∗ is a best reply to   whenever   ( ) ∈   (  ) ∩   
  for
each   ∈  1( ∗) and   ( ) =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗).
Assume  ∗ is a strict substitute perfect equilibrium for  -player normal form
game Γ. Suppose by contradiction for every neighborhood   of  ∗ there exists a
strategy proﬁle    with   (  ) ∈   (  ) ∩   
  for all   ∈  1( ∗), and   (  ) =  ∗
  for
all   ∈  2( ∗) (call it condition (∗) for   ), such that  ∗ is not in the best responce
for   .
Given the neighborhood   of  ∗, deﬁne     (  ) = sup ∈{1,..., } {∥ ∗
  −   ∥ :    ∈   (  )}.
Consider the sequence of neighborhoods of  ∗, {   }
∞
 =1 such that     (   ) → 0
as   → ∞. Let {  }
∞
 =1 be the corresponding sequence of strategy proﬁles such that
condition (∗) holds. Then {  } is an ultra-substitute sequence for  ∗, for we have
sup ∈{1,..., } ∥ ∗
  −   
  ∥ → 0 as   → ∞. But this is a contradiction, since  ∗ is a strict
substitute perfect equilibrium. This proves our claim.
Now we prove the desired implication. Let  ∗ be a strict substitute perfect equi-
librium, and ﬁx   ∈   such that   ( ) ∈   (  ) ∩ ∂   for each   ∈  1( ∗) and
  ( ) =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗). Let {  } be any ultra-substitute sequence approach-
ing   such that    ∈   for each  .  ∗ is a best responce to    for each  . Then
by upper-hemicontinuity of the best responce correspondence, which follows from
Berge’s maximum theorem,  ∗ is a best responce to   (since lim →∞    =  ). Hence
 ∗ is a best responce to   whenever   ( ) ∈   (  ) ∩   
  for each   ∈  1( ∗) and
  ( ) =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗).
(⇐) Let   be such neighborhood of  ∗ that  ∗ ia a best reply to   whenever
  ( ) ∈   (  ) for all   ∈  1( ∗) and   ( ) =  ∗
  for all   ∈  2( ∗). Suppose by
contradiction  ∗ is not a strict substitute perfect equilibrium. Then there exists an
ultra-substitute sequence for  ∗, {  }
∞
 =1 satisfying10
∀  ∈ ℕ ∃  ≥   such that  ∗ is not a best reply for   .
Let   be such index that   (  ) ∈   (  ) for all   ∈  1( ∗), and   (  ) ∈   (  )
for all   ≥   and for all   ∈  1( ∗). Such   exists since    is an ultra-substitute
sequence for  ∗. But then there exists   ≥   such that  ∗ is not a best responce for
  , which together with   (  ) ∈   (  ) for all   ∈  1( ∗) drives to a contradiction.
Theorem 4.5. For any ﬁnite normal form game Γ a strict substitute perfect equi-
librium is a Nash equilibrium for Γ.
The proof of this theorem is trivial, for strict substitute perfect equilibrium is a
substitute perfect equilibrium (which is impled by the fact that for any   ∈  , any
ultra-substitute sequence for   is a substitute sequence for  ). It was proven by
Selten [14] that every substitute perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
The following theorem shows that the equilibrium concept introduced in this
paper is a reﬁnement of strict perfection. Obviously it is stronger than Theorem 3.5,
however in its proof we used the fact that every strict substitute perfect equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium. Using the characterization of strict substitute perfect equilibria
expressed in Lemma 3.4. makes the proof of the following theorem tractable.
Theorem 4.6. If a strategy proﬁle  ∗ is strict substitute perfect equilibrium, then it
is strict perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that  ∗ ∈   is strict substitute perfect equilibrium. Let ˜   be the
neighborhood of  ∗ satisfying conditions of Lemma 3.4, that is,  ∗ is a best reply to
  whenever   ( ) ∈   (˜   ) for all   ∈  1( ∗) and   ( ) =  ∗
  for all   ∈  2( ∗).
Fix   > 0, and consider the neighborhood of  ∗ given by   = ˜   ∩   ( ∗), where
  ( ∗) is the  -ball about  ∗. Fix a sequence of perturbed games ˆ Γ , and let ˆ    be
the corresponding sequence of strategy spaces for ˆ Γ . Since lim →∞ ˆ    =  , then
∃  ∈ ℕ ∋ ∀  ≥   : ˆ  
  ∩   (  ) ∕= ∕⃝, ∀  ∈  1( 
∗).
Claim: for every   ≥   there exists a strategy proﬁle    satisfying   
  ∈ ∂ ˆ   
  ∩   
for all   ∈  1( ∗) and   
  =  ∗
  for all   ∈  2( ∗), such that    is an equilibrium point
of ˆ Γ .11
Indeed, ﬁx   ≥  , and note that ˆ    ∩   (  ) ∕= ∕⃝, for all   ∈  1( ∗). Fix
  ∈  1( ∗), and let    be the face of the unit simplex    that is the best reply to
any  −  satisfying condition (∗). Notice that since  ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we have
 ∗
  ∈   . Let ˆ   
  be the corresponding face of the unit simplex ˆ   
 , then by Lemma
3.5 from [3], ˆ   
  is the best reply to any    ∈ ˆ   
  satisfying condition (∗) (taking  
as a neighborhood of  ∗).
Also ˆ   
  ∩   ∕= ∕⃝ since ˆ   
  ∩   ∕= ∕⃝. Pick any   
  ∈ ˆ   
  ∩   for each   ∈  1( ∗), and
let   
  =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗). Then the tuple    = (  
1,  
2,...,  
 ) is an equilibrium
point of ˆ Γ . Indeed,   
  ∈    for every   ∈  1( ∗) and   
  =  ∗
  for each   ∈  2( ∗), so
   satisﬁes condition (∗). We also have   
  ∈ ˆ   
  for every   ∈  1( ∗). Therefore    is
a best reply to itself. Observation that   
  ∈ ˆ    shows that    is a Nash equilibrium
for ˆ Γ .
Thus we just proved existence of an equilibrium point for eventually all ˆ Γ  within
 -neighborhood of  ∗, for any   > 0. Letting   ↓ 0, we conclude that  ∗ is strict
perfect equilibrium.
We try to provide justiﬁcation for the equilibrium reﬁnement introduced in this
paper and show the ways it captures the intuition about how the game is to be
played. Introducing the perfect equilibria, Selten required it to be stable against
at least one sequence of perturbations of rationality, that is to be a limit point of
equilibria for some sequence of perturbed games. Okada strengthened this concept,
requiring strict perfect eqiuilibria to be stable against any sequence of trembles
approaching zero.
The idea of our equilibrium reﬁnement is based upon so-called “trembling-hand
miopy”. We can describe it as follows: consider the standard trembling-hand frame-
work, where there is a slight chance of rationality break-down. The main reason for
introducing the ultra-substitute sequences and using it to obtain our equilibrium re-
ﬁnement is that the interior strategy proﬁles are not disturbed for suﬃciently small
trembles. At the same time strategy proﬁles that are on the boundary of the strat-
egy set cannot be implemented due to trembles, and they are approximated by the
sequence of completely mixed strategy proﬁles.
When player   is choosing best reply against some strategy proﬁle  − , if some
   such that   ∕=   is on the boundary of   , player   knows that    cannot be im-
plemented due to trembles, however rather some approximating proﬁle from certain
neighborhood of    is to be played. Since the moves are made simultaneously, player12
1/2 u d
A 1, -1 0, 3
B 1, 2 0, -2
C 0, 0 0, 0
Table 1
  cannot distinguish between the strategy proﬁles from that neighborhood (which we
call “trembling-hand miopy”), and to ensure stability of the equilibrium point,
we require that    is a best reply no matter which point from the suﬃciently small
neighborhood of    is chosen.
The following example provides a further motivation for our reﬁnement.
Example 4.7. Consider the two-person normal form game depicted in the Table 1.
There is a continuum of Nash equilibria (among which the pure strategies equi-
libria are ( , ), ( , ) and ( , )):
(1) strategy proﬁles satisfying    = 1,    ≥   
(2) proﬁles with    =    = 0.5, 0 <    < 1, and
(3) strategy proﬁles satisfying    ≤   ,    = 1.
An equilibrium point with    =    = 1 looks inferior, for it gives the smallest equi-
librium payoﬀ to either player. No surprise, it does not even satisfy the perfectness
criterion. However even strict perfect equilibria may turn out to be unreasonable.
Notice that an equilibrium point   such that   ( ) =   ( ) = 0.5,   ( ) = 1 is
strictly perfect and hence proper. However, we argue that this equilibrium point
hardly can be considered reasonable, that is we would not expect it to be an outcome
whenever the game is played. Calculating expected payoﬀs at  , we get  1( ) = 0
and  1( ) = 0.5. At the same time an equilibrium point   with   ( ) = 1,   ( ) = 1
yields higher payoﬀs to both players - 1 and 2, respectively. Even an equilibrium
proﬁle   such that   ( ) = 1,   ( ) = 1 brings higher payoﬀ to the second player,
leaving player 1 as well-oﬀ as before. In this case we say that proﬁle   Pareto
dominates proﬁle  , while   weakly Pareto dominates  .
Equilibrium proﬁle   fails to be strict substitute perfect, while it is proper and
even strictly perfect.
From the previous example one would hope that the concept of strict substitute
perfect equilibrium rules out unreasonable equilibria in the sence of Pareto dom-
inance. Unfortunately, this is not true in general: the game depicted in Table 213
1/2 u d
A 0.5, -1 2, 3
B 1, 2 0, -2
C 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2
illustrates this assertion. We perturb our previous example slightly, so that now
proﬁle   Pareto dominates proﬁle  . However, it can be easily seen from the graph
of the best responces that an equilibrium proﬁle   is strict sibstitute perfect.
Nevetherless, it turns out that our equilibrium reﬁnement is attractive in the
sense that it captures the idea of strategical dominance. In game theory we usually
deal with the concept of “global” dominance, as described in Deﬁnition 2.7. It may
happen, however, that for generic player   some strategy    is dominant only in
some region - subset of  − . We then introduce the idea of local dominance (or
dominance on a subset).
Deﬁnition 4.8. A strategy ˜    of player   is called a weakly (strictly) dominant
strategy on a subset   ⊆  −  if for every  −  ∈   and    ∈   ,   (˜   , − ) ≥
  (  , − ) (correspondingly,   (˜   , − ) >   (  , − )).
It follows from Lemma 3.4 that given a strict substitute perfect equilibrium point
 ∗, for each   ∈   we can ﬁnd a region - subset of  −  containing  ∗
− , on which  ∗
 
is weakly dominant. This region may not be a neighborhood of  ∗
−  because some
 ∗
  for   ∕=   could be in the interior of   . It may even happen that this region
degenerates to a single point (as in the case of the classical Matching Pennies game
with two players, where  ∗
1 = 1
2 is a best reply to  2 if and only if  2 = 1
2).
However, if  ∗
  is not interior for every   ∈  , then  ∗ is dominant on some
neighborhood of itself. The above considerations are summarized in the following
theorem, which results directly from Lemma 3.4.
Theorem 4.9. An equilibrium proﬁle  ∗ is strict substitute perfect if and only if
for each player  ,  ∗
  is weakly dominant on a set    ⊆  −  such that   (  ) is
some neighborhood of  ∗
  for each   ∈  1( ∗)∖{ } and   (  ) =  ∗
  for each   ∈
 1( ∗)∖{ }.14
5. Conclusions
We introduced strict substitute perfect equilibria as a reﬁnement of perfectness
concept, which turns out to be stronger than strict perfect or proper equilibria. The
main advantage of the new solution concept is that it reﬂects the local dominance
of a strategy proﬁle. This is a desirable property since according to our intuition,
the dominating strategy proﬁles should be considered desirable equilibria.
Our reﬁnement is robust to arbitrary imperfections of rationality under the so-
called “trembling-hand miopy” (in contrast, strict perfect equilibria are stable with
respect to arbitrary, and perfect equilibria - with respect to certain imperfections of
rationality, which may fail under the “trembling-hand miopy”).
Among the weaknesses of strict substitute perfectness are the failure to rule out
all Pareto inferior perfect equilibria and the nonexistence property - in general such
equilibrium may not exist. This happens because even perfect equilibrium point
doesn’t have to satisfy local dominance. The local dominance is a very desirable
property, however for some games it’s never satisﬁed, so there is no strict substitute
perfect equilibrium for such games.
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